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Terrorism and Crime: Critical Linkages
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OBJECTIVE
This paper is an effort to analyze past terrorist activities within the context of present and future
activities.
FAILED STATES, CRIME, AND TERRORISM
The latter decades of the twentieth century witnessed a proliferation of new nation states. Some
were products of the demise of colonialism while others were created by the collapse of the
Soviet Union. A consistent characteristic of those new regimes was their lack of efficacy. One
reflection of this deficiency is the proliferation of criminal activities and terrorist organizations
within their jurisdictions,
TERRORIST -CRIMINAL COORDINATION
Typologies of terrorist groups attempt to place groups in distinct and presumably mutually
exclusive categories. Reality, however, is much more complex and groups routinely embrace
multiple motives for their activities . International terrorism and organized crime both pose serious
and evolving challenges to U.S. national security interests. Terrorists and criminals have
coordinated for mutual gain, providing physical protection in exchange for monetary gain and
other mutual beneficial transactions. The specific dynamics vary from region to region, country to
country. Ominously, there is potential for greater cooperation along the criminal-terrorist axis.
MOTIVATIONAL DYNAMICS AND CONSTRAINTS
There are, however, constraints to sustained high-level cooperation among these groups.
Alliances are numerous but may be temporary because groups embrace different primary
motives. Criminal groups traffic in illicit goods and services to maximize profits, whereas terrorists
traffic in violence to maximize power. Of course, there are also "gray areas" where political,
religious, and criminal motivations mix with one another. Some alliances are clearly marriages of
convenience but others result from leadership transformations.
TERRORIST -CRIMINAL THREAT ASSESSMENT
Terrorist -criminal links in Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries pose one of the greatest potential
threats to U.S. security, as many of these states are rent with economic instability, political
turmoil, and religious fervor. Given sufficient profit incentives, criminal groups may be tempted to
steal nuclear materials from poorly guarded Russian facilities and sell them to terrorist groups.
The flight of Al Qaeda affiliates from Afghanistan into Central Asia following the US-led military
intervention in 2001 has exacerbated this problem. Over the longer term, the evolving nature of
terrorist-criminal links in FSU countries and elsewhere will depend on several wildcards, including
inter-state war, famine, pestilence, and large-scale migrations.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2001, our attention has been focused on International terrorism. However, both
international terrorism and organized crime pose serious and evolving challenges to U.S. national
security interests. Terrorist -criminal links are evident in virtually every region of the world. Some
terrorist and criminal groups have coordinated for mutual gain, exchanging protection for money,
as well as other mutually beneficial transactions. Though there is certainly potential for greater
cooperation along the criminal-terrorist axis, there are also constraints that will limit such
coordination. After all, terrorist and criminal groups are driven by different motives and sustained
coordination requires a high degree of operational security.

May 12, 1972 Baader-Meinhof
bombing outside the federal police
Munich Office.

Building 131 at Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia, after the June 25, 1996 terrorist
bombing.

Terrorism has been a focal point of research and analysis since the 1970s, when terrorist
hijackings and kidnappings attracted international press coverage. International criminal
organizations have garnered more recent attention, most of it since the Cold War ended. Most
studies tend to treat the two phenomena independently, or to lump them together under the rubric
of "narcoterrorism." This analysis will examine and compare terrorism and criminal groups with
respect to their motivation s (and in particular those in Latin America and the former Soviet Union),
organization, and modus operandi.
th

Even before the attacks of September 11 , terrorists had inflicted devastating strikes on the
United States, including the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, the August 1998 destruction
of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the June 1996 bombing on Khobar Towers in Saudi
Arabia, and the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York.
In addition to killing innocents and destroying property, major terrorist attacks have forced
democratic governments to make dramatic policy concessions. Terrorist strikes have prompted
the following actions: U.S. military withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 after the attack on the Marine
barracks there; Israel's decision to enter serious negotiations with the Palestine Liberation
Organization, and pullout from southern Lebanon in 2000; and the United Kingdom's decision to
negotiate with Sinn Fein, the political front of the Irish Republican Army. On the eve of the
Spanish elections in 2004, attacks on the Madrid train system apparently resulted in a change of
administration and a reversal of Spanish support for US and UK military operations in Iraq.
International criminal organizations also threaten U.S. national security. Increased international
trade and advances in telecommu nications have extended the tentacle-like reach of those
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groups; they threaten nascent democracies, corrupt ruling elites, undermine the rule of law, and
cost states billions of dollars in drug prevention, interdiction and treatment programs. Sometimes
they forge opportunistic links with international terrorists for mutual gain. An inability to control
rampant criminality is a major factor in what is often seen as an epidemic of regime failure in the
st
21 century.

MOTIVATIONS CONTRASTED
Operating outside the norms of civilized behavior, terrorists use violence and the threat of
violence against noncombatants to achieve political or religious ends. International terrorists
operate across state borders. Some terrorist groups enjoy political, diplomatic, material, or
financial assistance from state-sponsors or emigrant communities abroad; others rely on
indigenous forms of support. In the past, nations such as Iraq and Libya made significant
contributions to international terrorism by way of their diplomatic pouches.
All terrorist groups traffic in violence. Though some engage in ordinary criminal behavior as well,
it is not their driving motivation, but a means to an end. Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighella,
author of The Minimanual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare, encouraged bank robberies as a means to
fund terrorist activity. Groups as diverse as the IRA in Northern Ireland, the Kurdish Workers'
Party in the Middle East, and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, have raised money
for terrorist ends with diverse criminal activities. Joseph Stalin’s first significant contributions to
the Bolshevik revolution were bank robberies throughout the Caucasus region.
In contrast, international
criminal groups engage in illicit,
cross-border activities, but are
motivated by financial
incentives. Sometimes they use
terrorist tactics, including
extortion, kidnapping and
murder, to reap profits.

Older forms of criminal behavior, such
as maritime piracy, remain very much
modern problems.
"Piracy," The Economist, December 18, 1999, pp.
91-93.

International criminals engage in a stunning range of activity. A partial list of criminal enterprises
would include narcotics production, trafficking, and distribution; money laundering and
counterfeiting; illicit arms and munitions transfers; kidnapping and extortion; human smuggling,
prostitution, and child pornography; and trade in endangered flora and fauna. Criminal
organizations transport their illegal goods by every imaginable mode of transportation, from jet
aircraft to human "mules" who swallow condoms filled with narcotics.
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In 2005 the simultaneous gas
attacks on four “Maksidom”
stores in Russia had
characteristics of an Al Qaeda
type incident but were actually
motivated by criminal intentions.

It is not surprising that the activities of criminal organizations are often mistaken for those of
terrorist groups. Initial and hasty news reports contribute to widespread confusion about violent
incidents. For example, the 2005 gas attacks on four “Maksidom” stores in St. Petersburg, Russia
were immediately described as a terrorist attack. The simultaneous incidents involved the use of
devises associated with terrorist groups and the planning resembled that of Islamic
fundamentalist attacks in London earlier that year. Subsequent investigations , however, revealed
this large Russian home improvements chain had been threatened by commercial rivals who
proclaimed their intention to ruin the store’s Christmas sales. Authorities found no links with
1
terrorist attacks associated with Islamic groups in Russia’s North Caucasus region.

"Narcotics remain the
most profitable
enterprise for
international criminal
organizations; but
trafficking in people
is the fastest
growing."

Federal prosecutors tape Mexican Mafia
operating in Los Angeles, September
1997.

Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Warns That
Trafficking In Human Beings Is Growing,"
The New York Times, June 25, 2000, p. 9.

International criminal organizations are often referred to as "cartels." Strictly speaking, the term is
a misnomer because the groups do not collude to fix the price of their products. Another popular
term, "narcoterrorism," is misleading to the extent it suggests all narcotics traffickers engage in
terrorism, or that all terrorists traffic in narcotics. Those dynamics vary depending on the region
and actors involved. Some groups embrace narcotics trafficking as a source of revenue; others
abstain from such links. In Central Asia, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is noted for its
involvement in drug trafficking while more devout Hizb ut-Tahrir, regarded by the Russian
2
government as a terrorist organization, eschews such activities. Even terrorists draw distinctions
among themselves. Nicolas Rodriguez, leader of Colombia's ELN, has tried to distinguish his
group's financing from the FARC's drug funding.
1

WWW.newsru.com , 27 December 2005
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Russia and Eurasia: Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Heritage Foundation, 2005,
www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia
2
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The key distinction, then, between international terrorist groups and their criminal counterparts
involves motivation. Criminal organizations traffic in illicit goods and services to maximize profits;
terrorists traffic in violence to maximize political power. When captured and prosecuted, terrorists
routinely turn their trials into political theater. In contrast, criminals generally deny their
wrongdoing or plea bargain and become informants against former partners.
Despite their different motivations, there are points of contact, even overlap, between terrorists
and their criminal counterparts. That reality does not invalidate the analytical distinction between
terrorists and criminals; instead, it indicates the presence of "gray areas" where political, religious,
and criminal motivations mix with one another.
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GRAY AREAS: The Former Soviet Union and the Balkans
Terrorist and criminal
motivations often overlap
with groups operating in the
FSU and the Balkans. The
former Yugoslavia has proven
fertile soil for hybrid
organizations. In Kosovo, for
example, the Kosovo
Liberation Army's (KLA) links
with drug traffickers and
international criminals have
been well-documented. The
KLA used those connections,
as well as contributions from
Albanian emigrant
communities abroad, to fund
its paramilitary campaign
against Serbian authorities.

Zelijko Raznatovic (aka "Arkan")
claimed he was member of
Yugoslavian "National Guard." He
was killed January 15, 2000.

KLA successfully recruited thousands of ethnic
Albanians for battle in Kosovo.

Serbia itself has become a haven of
international criminal activity. Serbian
criminal groups operating abroad help fund
militia groups in the Balkans. Zeljko
Raznatovic ("Arkan the Cat") recruited his
ethnic cleansers from a network of
criminals. Arkan robbed banks and jewelry
stores in Western Europe before leading
his ruthless paramilitaries in the Croatian
and Bosnian wars in the early 1990's.

According to INDEM, a non-governmental non-profit public association based in Moscow,
corruption in post-Soviet Russia has escalated to such an extent that the country is in danger of
becoming a criminal-syndicalist state. Institutionalized corruption there has paralleled the growth
of international criminal organizations. Routine interactions between citizens and the federal
bureaucracy typically involve bribery. In its annual report, INDEM maintains that bribes paid to
officials by businessmen may have increased ten fold over the last four years. The amount of
these bribes is over twice the size of the entire Russian state budget. Corruption in the military
has become a serious problem as well, fueling the black market for illicit arms and raising the
specter of disgruntled personnel trafficking biological, chemical, or perhaps even nuclear
weapons. The military is also plagued by bribery as parents pay to avoid military service for their
children while the universities accept and perhaps expect bribes to guarantee such children a
3
place in the university.
As a transitional nation, it is Russia is enduring social, political, and economic changes which, not
surprisingly create conditions conducive to crime. Since the deterioration of the Soviet state in the
late 1980s and its collapse in 1991, numerous studies have explored this phenomenon. Marx and
subsequent Marxist -Leninist theoreticians had argued that their system, by its very nature,
insured that criminality would not long exist. The reality is very different and the prospects for the

3

Steven Eke, “Corruption ‘Skyrockets’ in Russia”, BBC News, 20 July, 2005
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stability of post-communist regimes are significantly limited by the explosion of crime in recent
years. 4
Russia is home base for an estimated 8,000 criminal gangs. Of those, at least 200 operate
worldwide. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian crime groups expanded their reach in
successive waves, penetrating the FSU; Central and Western Europe, with heavy activity in
Germany and Italy; South and Southeast Asia; and Latin and North America. Russian criminal
groups help transport narcotics from the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent to Western
Europe. Kazakhstan provides a natural conduit for Southeast Asian heroin flowing into Russian.
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan provide routes for Southwest Asian heroin-mostly from
Afghanistan-into Russia.
Sizeable criminal groups have emerged in virtually all the FSU states. Significant players include
Armenians, Azerbajianis, Dagestanis, Georgians, and Ingush. The Chechens are widely
recognized as the most "ruthless and ambitious Caucasian criminals." They operate in numerous
FSU countries, Western Europe and North America. The Russians have blamed them for terrorist
bombings in Moscow and numerous other cities with a death toll rising to more than 300 people
per year by 2000. In the following years, the toll has continued to rise, far exceeding what was, in
its time, regarded as a devastating figure.
Chechen clans fiercely oppose Russian authority, a fact that was demonstrated by the 1994-96
war in Chechnya and the more recent conflicts that were sparked in 1999. Those clans are driven
by a protean blend of political, religious, and criminal motivations. Some have engaged in terrorist
activity, targeting of civilians with assassination and hostage-taking.
Rebel leaders like Shamil Basayev,
Ameer Khattab (aka Habib Abdul
Rahman), and Abu Daba should
not be dismissed or
underestimated as mere warlords;
they have sustained sophisticated
political -military campaigns
against Russian authorities,
requiring complex financial,
logistical, and combat operations.
They also have mobilized Wahhabi
extremists and Afghani
mercenaries to further their own
objectives.

Jordanian-born Gen. Shamil Basayev insists
he did not bomb Moscow in 1999.

Their financial support is derived from several sources. Since the second Chechen war,
Chechnya has been plagued by lawlessness and, in this environment, criminals enjoy enormous
profits by stealing oil, running kidnapping networks, and diverting money that was intended for
reconstruction projects.
The siphoning of oil from pipelines is the most common method of petroleum theft. Chechen
groups have long targeted the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline which passes through Chechnya. The
theft and illegal refining of oil has become one of the most consistent income sources for
Chechen criminal organizations. Ingushetia, Dagestan and North Ossetia have become
dependent on these illegal petroleum transactions. Supporters of the late Chechen President
Akhmad Kadyrov have developed a more sophisticated method of petroleum theft. Known as the
4

William Alex Pridemore, Ruling Russia : Law, Crime, and Justice in a Changing Society, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005, pp. 10-21
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'Kadyrovtsy', these individuals have devised a system for stealing directly from oil wells and, with
the connivance of security forces, helping run improvised petroleum refineries. 5
In order to protect against diversion of gas supplies, the government was forced to establish the
oil regiment, a police organization that specializes in responding to this activity.
Trafficking in illegal arms was, until recent years, a major source of criminal funding for terrorism
in Chechnya. Between 1996 and 1999, the years in which Grozny, Chechnya’s capitol city, was in
the hands of rebel forces, there was an open, legal arms bazaar in the city centre. Small arms
such as machine guns, pistols, and hand grenades could be freely purchased at very reasonable
prices. In the current environment of routine police searches, private ownership of weapons has
become less common and terrorists are less dependent on weapons sales to finance their
activities in Chechnya.
Kidnappings and narcotics traffic provide them with additional revenue. Chechnya’s hostage
business dramatically escalated after 1997 when a Russian television crew was ransomed for an
estimated one million dollars. After 2000 when rebel forces fled Grozny, Chechen terrorists found
that senior Russian military officers could be forced to pay up to $300 for the body of each
serviceman who died in combat. 6
Few groups have demonstrated the linkage between crime and terrorism more dramatically than
the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) which was formed as a purely criminal group
following the first Chechen war. When the war resumed in 1999, SPIR expanded its objectives to
include terrorist activities against the Russian government. Gang leader Arbi Barayev, who
comes from one of Chechnya’s most prominent criminal families, forged an alliance with Islamic
militants who could generate foreign sources of funding for the gang. Eventually, the SPIR
evolved from a purely criminal gang into a complex organization advocating militant Islam and
7
Chechen nationalism.
The large Chechen diaspora also has helped sustain terrorist and criminal activity in Chechnya.
Operating in refugee camps all the way from Moldova into Western Europe, the overseas
Chechens have represented an important reserve component for Chechen gangs.
Muslim governments in the Middle East did not originally support the Chechen efforts to achieve
political independence, despite previous support for the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians
in the Balkans. The Caucasus and Balkans each have a distinctive religious milieu. The
Chechens are Muslim, but they traditionally practiced Sufism, a mystical variant of Islam that is
rejected by Middle East regimes. In Chechnya, the organizational links are primarily clan-based
and Nakshbandi Sufism has long been the predominant religious tie among the brotherhoods.
Furthermore, the nationalism of the early Chechen fighters ran counter to the internationalism of
Islamic fundamentalists such as Al Qaeda.
th

In recent years and especially since the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11 , 2001, Islamic
militant groups from the Middle East have become a more significant factor in this region.
According to a State Department annual report on terrorism, even before 2001, there was
“evidence of substantial financial support reaching the Chechen and Dagestan rebels from the
Arab world, along with scores of volunteers from Egypt, Pakistan and Afghanistan." Moreover, the
Chechen rebels have "received some support from foreign mujahideen with extensive links to
Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Central Asian Islamic extremists, as well as Osama Bin Ladin."

5

Timur Aliyev, “War Racketeers Plague Chechnya”, Moscow News, 11 January 2005
Ibid.
7
“Group Profile: Special Purpose Islamic Regiment”, Terrorism Knowledge Base, www.tkb.org
6
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The Chechen emigrant community in Jordan is particularly strong, with some 10,000 members ,
and exhibits a high degree of activism in pursuit of Chechen goals.
GRAY AREAS: Latin America
In Latin America, criminal and terrorist links are well-established. Beginning in the 1980s, the
Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), one of the region's most violent groups, aligned itself
with coca growers and narcotics traffickers operating out of the Huallaga Basin. The terrorist
group provided protection in exchange for taxes. The revenue helped sustain the insurgency,
providing money for arms, munitions, and other operational expenses. The Shining Path
established a department of organizational support that played a crucial logistical role in the
group’s operations. One member of that department, former ballerina Maritza Garrido Lecca, who
received a twenty year sentence in 2005 for providing shelter for the Shining Path leader, was the
subject of the popular novel The Dancer Upstairs by Nicholas Shakespeare as well as a movie
8
based on the novel. The Shining Path model has been adopted, in varied degrees, by several
other Latin American terrorist groups, including the FARC and the ELN.
Colombian
terrorists rely
on funding from
narcotics and
kidnappings.

With an estimated 12,000-15,000 troops, the FARC is the largest terrorist group in Latin America.
In the 1980s, it became involved in narcotics trafficking to further its political aims. Its revenue
from narcotics traffic exceeds more than $500 million a year. The ELN, Colombia's second
largest terrorist organization, also relies on narcotics trafficking for funding, though to a much
lesser extent. This group prefers high-profile kidnappings, including one in 1999 that involved 160
church hostages in Cali.
A rightist paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), is involved in
the narcotics trade as well. Led by Carlos Castano, the AUC has admitted its involvement in the
8

Jeremy McDermott, “Ex-ballerina gets 20 years in jail for letting rebels hide in her home”, The Scotsman,
6 October 2005.
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drug trade, justifying it as necessary to cover their operational expenses. In 2001, the US
Department of State designated the AUC as a foreign terrorist organization under U.S. law. In
2003, following the revaluation of the State Department’s list, the AUC was re-designated as a
9
foreign terrorist organization.
The election of Evo Morales to the Bolivian presidency in 2005 raised further questions about the
political future of South America. The leftist agenda his political party, the Movement Toward
Socialism , his background as a former coca leaf-grower, and his advocacy of legalization of coca
production raised legitimate concerns that Bolivia under Morales might become a contributing
factor to the "narcoterrorist ” tendency seen in recent years. 10
Foreign governments will often
minimize evidence of criminal
activity when negotiating with
terrorist insurgencies. Shortly after
his election, Colombian President
Andres PastranaArango launched
peace talks with both FARC and
the ELN for the first time in eight
years. President Pastrana has
claimed that the FARC's
involvement in narcotics is limited,
despite ample evidence to the
contrary.

Andrés Pastrana Arango,
President of Colombia

ORGANIZATION
LEADERS
All terrorist and criminal groups involve some form of hierarchy. Traditionally, terrorist leaders
have appeared more important to their organizations than their criminal counterparts. In the past,
the capture or death of a leader very often crippled a terrorist group, as happened to the Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru after the government apprehended Abimael Guzman Reynoso
in September 1992. Guzman was succeeded by Principal Regional Committee leader Oscar
Alberto Ramirez Durand (alias "Feliciano") who, in turn, was captured by government forces in
July 1999. Neither Durand nor his successor, Filomeno Cerron Cardoso (alias "Artemio"), has
reversed the group's decline. Much speculation has surrounded the question of Osama bin
Laden’s importance to Al Qaeda and whether or not the organization would survive his death.

9

US Department of State Press Statement, 10 September 2003.
“Leftist Claims Victory in Bolivia”, BBC News, 19 December 2005

10
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In Europe, the 1999 capture
of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan
dealt a serious blow to his
organiza tion. For the most
part, his supporters have been
reduced to protesting his
incarceration and granting his
release. Also in 1999, the
capture of group leader Ta
Mok helped doom the Khmer
Rouge as a viable terrorist
insurgency in Asia.

Abimael Guzman Reynoso lecturing the press
after his capture.

Typically, the death or capture of a criminal organization leader often has only a marginal impact.
In the mid-1990s, for example, Colombia authorities arrested or induced the surrender of seven
leaders of the Cali crime syndicate. Smaller groups quickly stepped in to fill the vacuum left by
Cali's dismemberment. Similarly, the death of Pablo Escobar, leader of the Medellin criminal
organization, in 1993, had little impact on the flow of narcotics traffic into the United States.
Colombia remains the hub of narcotics activity; coca cultivation and leaf production has increased
there every year since 1995.
In contrast with terrorist organizations, criminal groups often have dynastic leadership structures.
In countries as diverse as Mexico, Sicily, and Russia, criminal groups often involve family-based
structures. For example, the Red Mafia organization is reportedly led by the Ukrainian-born
Semion Mogilevich and to include many of his relatives.
The vulnerability of terrorist groups to the loss of a leader has diminished with the development of
the cellular structure more often associated with Islamic fundamentalist groups. This change is a
function of a disturbing trend in which groups have developed important organizational learning
skills. Such adaptability is an indication of sophistication thought to be beyond the reach of Middle
Eastern terrorist groups and has been demonstrated by a variety of terrorist groups outside the
Middle East. Key to this development has been recognition of the fact that terrorist violence
means that there will be personnel losses and that an institutionalization of knowledge is essential
to retention of a group’s fighting capability. Effective organizational learning skills are developed
11
within an organization and, for that reason, are difficult to study from outside the group.
More generally, many international terrorist and criminal groups maintain an ethnic or racial
composition that makes it more difficult for outsiders to infiltrate. The closed nature of some of the
ethnic communal groups to outsiders, enhanced by language barriers and an identification of
police as the enemy, makes immigran t communities ideal recruiting and operation grounds for
criminal organizations. A major barrier to effective counterterrorist operations during the war on
terrorism has been Western difficulties in penetrating such communities. In 2004, former FBI
translator Sibel D. Edmonds observed that a language barrier and a cultural divide were inhibiting
federal efforts to secure accurate translations of Arab language sources. Some native speakers,
according to Edmonds, deliberately mistranslated documents as an expression of their hostility
toward the United States. Officials have noted that because there is a chronic shortage of Arabic
translators, many agencies have been forced to hire many Middle Eastern immigrants whose
backgrounds cannot be thoroughly checked. 12

11

Brian Jackson, et al, Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating
Terrorism, RAND, 2005, pp. 24-26
12
Paul Sperry, “FBI Arab Translators and 11 September”, WND, 7 January 2004
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
Individuals with professional and technical skills are readily found in sophisticated criminal
syndicates. They use computers and advanced technology to manage their financial affairs, track
accounts, effect wire transfers, and encrypt communications. Equipped with cutting-edge
commercial technology, advanced criminal organizations often outstrip the technical capabilities
of states trying to pursue them. Those advantages often allow the groups to innovate criminal
activity faster than legal authorities can respond. The use of computers and other
communications technologies by terrorist groups, however, can backfire, as government
authorities occasionally capture hard drives and diskettes containing valuable files and intercept
cell and satellite phone conversations . Satellite phones are generally presumed to have been a
major tool in Osama bin Laden’s escape from US troops in Afghanistan in 2001.
Like large corporations, sophisticated criminal and terrorist groups require a division of labor.
Desired professions include accountants, marketing specialists, managers, communications
experts, money launderers, intelligence and counterintelligence specialists. Criminal groups also
place a high value on economists and lawyers. Terrorist groups have recruited military personnel
in hope of exploiting their professional expertise. Individuals with the required skills command
generous salaries for their services.
Some criminal groups have made aggressive forays into computer crime and bank fraud. The full
extent of such penetration is unknown, as financial institutions are generally loath to admit their
vulnerabilities. Criminal groups also have exploited a wide range of off-shore banking facilities to
launder their profits.
Like their terrorist counterparts, criminal organizations vary in size; they may involve anywhere
from a few dozen to several thousand workers. Small terrorist groups and solo terrorists are
usually more difficult to track and apprehend; they can remain dormant for months, even years.
Though terrorist organizations may have thousands of passive sympathizers, the number of
active members is usually much smaller and are more tightly organized than criminal
organizations. Many groups have at most a few hundred members; some have only a few dozen,
or less. The Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB) which is most prominent Chechen
terrorist organizations had a membership of only 400 people in 2005, a year in which it was very
13
active.

13

“The Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade”, www.tkb.org, 11 April 2005
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LOOSE NETWORKS
Terrorist groups based on loose
networks have certain
advantages over tightly
controlled ones. Subgroups
have the freedom to exploit
local circumstances and targets
of opportunity, which allows
umbrella group leaders to
encourage terrorist activity
while at the same time
disavowing responsibility for
them.

"A haul of rocket launchers,
plastic explosives and other
weapons confiscated in
Croatia was destined for
renegade republican paramilitaries.…"
World Briefing," New York Times, 29 July 2000.

Links among different terrorist groups and their state sponsors are often difficult to discern. Both
groups have a strong interest in operating clandestinely. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact members provided direct and indirect support to anti-Western terrorist
groups. A study in the early 1980s, in exploring the concept of state sponsorship of terrorism,
carefully documented this relationship and maintained that the Soviet Union enjoyed control over
many international terrorist organizations. The collapse of the communist insurgency in El
Salvador following the demise of the USSR indicated that there were some instances in which
14
Soviet control and support were vital. Others did less to support Claire Sterling’s contention.
Today, umbrella groups involving loose confederations of like-minded terrorist organizations
supplement state sponsors. Religious leaders may issue general commands or fatwas, as did
Osama bin Laden in February 1998. Osama bin Laden, in developing Al-Qaeda, included the
Egyptian Islamic radical groups Al Jihad and Gamaat Islamiya as important allies and provided
support for numerous other groups. With this organizational philosophy, Al Qaeda had created
cells in more than 50 countries well before gaining worldwide notoriety through the September
th
11 attacks.
From its first days, Al Qaeda invested heavily in training cadres. Its training camps in Afghanistan
and Sudan prepared thousands of Islamic militants for revolutionary struggles in countries such
as Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Egypt, Kashmir, Lebanon, the Philippines, Russian,
Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
There is no analogue in the world of international crime to bin Laden's network. Criminal groups
occasionally coordinate their activities with one another, to be sure, but they are not driven by an
overarching religious or political agenda.
FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
Terrorist groups organize themselves along cellular lines to reduce their vulnerability to outside
penetration. "To avoid detection they [terrorists] tend to be organized in cells of 3-5 persons, with
only the leader knowing the real names of other cell leaders and their whereabouts." Criminal
organizations use cellular structures for the same reason.
Both groups also use front organizations to advance their aims. According to Michael Sheehan,
former US State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "In many states where the
government is weak in providing basic public health services, these groups [terrorists] create
14

Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism, Henry Holt & Co
(March, 1981)
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parallel public institutions, such as schools, public health services, and social networks." Criminal
groups have engaged in similar maneuvers. Pablo Escobar helped build housing and soccer
stadiums in poor areas and Al Qaeda has long boasted an extensive network for social service
activities in target areas.
Criminal groups prefer to cover their illicit activities with legitimate businesses. This technique
allows criminals to launder illicit profits, draws investment capital away from legitimate business
enterprises, undermines respect for the rule of law, and makes it more difficult for legitimate
authorities to stigmatize criminal behavior.
Semion Mogilevich, who operated out of Budapest, and was linked to financial fraud and
trafficking in narcotics, arms, and prostitution is a good illustration of this. He has reportedly
coordinated some of those activities with other Russian criminal groups and the Italian Camorra
and established legitimate holdings into Hungary's arms business. His legitimate purchases
include Magnex 2000, Digep General Machine Works, and Army Co-op.
German unification provided Russian mafias with a unique opportunity to acquire front
organizations. In 1992, Berlin Police President Georg Schertz saw "a kind of gold rush by the
various crime syndicates," and Berlin police established a "Russian Mafia" squad. A
parliamentary inquiry in 1993 found "clear links between organised crimes in the drug trades,
smuggling and prostitution and some firms set up by former east German communists."

MODUS OPERANDI
Terrorist s use a blend of old and new tactics to further their strategic aims. Assassinations,
hijackings, and bombings remain staples. Exploiting modern technology, some groups have used
video cameras for training and reconnaissance purposes, and computers to store files. Most
terrorist groups have adapted quickly to the Internet, exploiting it as a tool to further their
legitimacy as well as to recruit new members. In the future, the Internet will be an even more
lucrative target for disruption and destruction as the global economy becomes increasingly
dependent on Web commerce. A series of incidents in 2003 and 2004 served as reminders of
how easily the international economy could be disrupted through cyber-terrorism.
So far, however, most international terrorist groups appear more inclined to exploit the Internet for
propaganda rather than to destroy it. Most terrorist groups tend to have one (or more) sites on the
th
Internet devoted to propaganda. Before September 11 , www.Azzam.com, an instrument of Al
Qaeda, was a consistent window into much of the group’s thinking. The Web page has
supplemented, though not replaced hand-printed flyers and leaflets, which remain reliable, lowbudget tools.
Of course, not every terrorist group seeks publicity. Some, such as the Greece-based
Revolutionary Organization November 17, shroud themselves in secrecy. Moreover, it has
become increasingly common for perpetrators not to claim credit for major terrorist attacks, as
happened with the downing of TWA 800. While he was photographed enjoying television reports
of the 2001 attacks on the US, Osama bin Laden did not claim credit for the actions until much
later and, even then, in a rather indirect manner. Even groups that aggressively publicize their
activities conceal their links with organized criminal groups, as those revelations would undermine
the alleged purity of their cause(s).
Secure communication is a prerequisite for effective coordination among terrorists and their
criminal counterparts. The Internet provides another potential avenue of communication between
the groups. Both terrorists and criminals use web sites for communication, command, and control
purposes.
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GROUP COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
Most terrorist groups seek
to overthrow states. Some
pro-state groups,
however, seek to defend
the existing political order.
That difference has fueled
fighting between terrorist
groups with opposing
ideologies, as has
occurred in Northern
Ireland, with Loyalist
terrorist groups combating
their Republican
counterparts. This
dynamic is also evident in
Colombia, with
paramilitary extremist
groups such as the AUC
fighting the FARC.

ETA Basque separatist July 29, 1995 bombing

International terrorist groups coordinate their activities for mutual gain. Recent reports of such
activity abound. In Europe, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and Breton separatists have
reportedly coordinated arms thefts in northern Spain. In the Middle East, evidence suggests arms
trafficking between Hizballah and Hamas. In Asia, reports indicate the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front and the New Peoples Army have coordinated local attacks in the Philippines. In Latin
America, the Japanese Red Army personnel have trained elements of the FARC in Colombia.
Sustained cooperation among terrorist groups appears less frequent, however, as it requires a
high level of operational security and a convergence of operational goals.
Criminal groups also form ad hoc alliances and networks for mutual gain. Colombian traffickers
have coordinated with Sicilian and Russian mafia groups; Mexican organizations have
collaborated with their Colombian counterparts; and Nigerian gangs have worked with numerous
foreign groups, making their country a major narcotics hub in Africa.
The same criminal groups have readily partnered with international terrorist organizations. In
2004 there were reports that a leading Al Qaeda operative, Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, had been
Honduras attending a meeting with the leadership of an El Salvadorian gang known as MS-13.
The gang has established extensive smuggling routes for bringing illegal aliens into the United
States. For Shukrijumah, an alliance with this violent gang represents an important opportunity for
penetrating the US borders in order to conduct attacks against domestic targets. In recent years
other groups are known to have played key roles in supplying terrorist groups with the weapons
15
needed for their attacks.
But cooperation among criminal groups is only part of the story. Turf wars involving these groups
have increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War as they struggle to establish
proprietary niches. Criminal gangs have fought one another in major European cities, including
Berlin and Warsaw. Russia has experienced the most severe gang-related violence, with gun
battles in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and Vladivostok. In St. Petersburg, for
example, the Tambov and Kazan criminal gangs engaged in a bloody struggle for supremacy in
the mid-1990s.

15
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Those violent dynamics reflect the opportunistic nature of international criminal groups.
Unconstrained by political considerations, they have greater operational flexibility than their
terrorist counterparts and are just as willing to fight one another as they are to collude for mutual
gain.
STATE SPONSORSHIP AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT
Some terrorist groups,
such as the FARC and
ELN in Colombia, are
self-sustaining, thanks to
their lucrative criminal
dealings. Most other
terrorist groups depend
on external support to
maintain their operations.
State-sponsored
assistance may include
material support through
weapons and ammunition
or political and ideological
assistance.

Tamil Elephant Pass Victory and Rising Day ("Eluchi
Vizha") in Germany, June 17-18, 2000

Or it may depend on the financial largess of emigrant communities
overseas. The LTTE, for example, relies heavily on expatriates in Canada.
Similarly, the PKK has drawn heavily on financial support from Kurds
throughout Western Europe.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies routinely provided assistance to
terrorist organizations that would otherwise have died for lack of material support. Statesponsorship continues today, though some of the players have changed. Outside support of
terrorist groups operating in and around the FSU is now more common than in Latin America.
Cuba's role in fomenting insurgencie s in Latin America has diminished considerably during the
last ten years. In contrast, Middle East groups have ratcheted up their support of Islamic terrorists
operating in Afghanistan , Iraq, and the FSU.
In Russia, the line between institutional corruption and criminal gangs has blurred since the end
of the Cold War. Some criminal groups have infiltrated the organs of state power, either through
elections or appointments. This process, sometimes referred to as "legalization," provides
criminals with a veneer of respectability.
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR
Organizational longevity is a function of adaptability or, as noted above, organizational learning.
The most durable terrorist groups are those that adjust to changing circumstances without
jettisoning their ideological moorings. Both the PLO and Sinn Fein have moderated their public
face without relinquishing their long-term goals. The challenge of adaptation confronted
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon once Israel withdrew its forces from the buffer zone.
The failure to adjust has led to the demise of several terrorist groups. On April 20, 1998, a
publication of the Red Army Faction (RAF) stated that "the urban guerilla battle of the RAF is now
history." The report noted that "the attempt of the RAF to adapt itself to the 1990s was
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unrealistic." East German sponsorship had helped the RAF adapt from one generation to the
next. After the Cold War ended, radically changed international circumstances, the lack of state
sponsorship, and member defections contributed to the group's demise.
In Peru, the Marxist -Leninist Tupac Amaru (MTRA) has faded into insignificance after its dramatic
seizure of Japan's embassy in 1996. The government raid on the embassy resulted in the death
of Nestor Cerpa, the MRTA's leader. The subsequent imprisonment of several other senior
leaders and bitter infighting has effectively marginalized this group.
In contrast, many criminal groups in Latin American have proven themselves highly adaptable.
Some have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to shift their transportation routes in response to
shifting law enforcement strategies. Some Colombian narcotics traffickers , for example, reduced
their reliance on Mexican smuggling routes and returned to Caribbean ones popular in the
1980's.
The Al Qaeda network has consistently demonstrated its adaptive capabilities since the United
States and its allies launched a war against Islamic terrorism. In 2004 there were reports of an Al
Qaeda “survival kit” that was prepared in order to help Al Qaeda operatives to survive on their
own and how to communicate safely with their leadership. The instructions stressed
decentralization, secrecy, and appeals to the religious sentiments of people with whom they live.
There was specific guidance on how to use the Internet and cell phones without being detected
as well as suggestions that they avoid frequenting the mosque on a regular basis. These
instructions were based on the assumption that Al Qaeda and its affiliates are involved in what
16
will be a long secret war against the Western nations.
FUTURE OPERATIONS
Certain dynamics of international terrorism have evolved along predictable trajectories-increased
violence is one notable trend, for example. Terrorists have used weapons ranging from machetes
to deadly toxins and biological agents but convention al bombings have been their most popular
tactic.
Predicting the likelihood of a terrorist group's recourse to weapons of mass destruction poses a
significant analytic challenge. Some terrorist groups appear more predisposed than others to
inflict mass casualties. Japan's Aum Shinrikyo ("Supreme Truth"), a large terrorist group driven by
an apocalyptic ideology, attempted several major attacks involving anthrax before turning to
chemical weapons. They are unlikely to be the last. While they have not yet used them, Osama
bin Laden's operatives trained to conduct attacks with toxic chemicals or biological agents.
So far, however, the ability of terrorist groups to inflict heavy casualties with conventional
explosives helps explain the relative infrequency of biological, chemical, or radiological attacks.
But this calculus is changing and apocalyptic and nihilist groups now seek more dramatic means
of attacking civilized societies. The fact that Shinrikyo's bioterrorist strikes failed should provide
little comfort. No doubt some groups will consider biological attacks too risky; others will attempt
to learn from Shinrikyo's mistakes.
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Reports indicate Osama bin Laden
attempted to purchase a nuclear
warhead. The more likely danger involves
attacks with radiological material. As one
expert noted:
The danger of terrorist groups going fully nuclear
is still considered small but the ability to
encapsulate conventional explosives with
radioactive materials like cesium-137 or cobalt90 in order to contaminate seats of government
or business centers for decades is already within
some terrorist groups' capability, certainly if
sponsored by a state which itself could construct
such a semi-nuclear device.
Even before 2001, Osama bin Laden
was known as "sponsor and financier
of Sunni Islamic extremist causes."

So far, international criminal organizations have lacked powerful incentives to traffic in weapons
of mass destruction, as other forms of illicit activity are more lucrative and less risky. That
calculation may well change as Islamic terrorist groups are demonstrating that they can call upon
significant financial resources. Should this happen, criminal groups will have access to wellestablished smuggling routes. Clearly, criminal groups have demonstrated a willingness to
develop and market new products; crack cocaine and synthetic designer drugs, for example,
reflects their desire for higher profit margins. These innovations reflect economic calculations, not
moral concerns. Al Qaeda and its affiliates may well demonstrate that there is a profit in
supporting international terrorism.
The most dangerous terrorist organizations are those such as Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo
because they combine extensive financial resources with an apocalyptic or nihilistic ideology. The
ability of such groups to forge operational links with criminal groups has increased their potential
reach and lethality.

CONCLUSIONS
International terrorist groups and criminal organizations differ primarily in their motivation.
Terrorists traffic in violence to maximize political power; criminals traffic in illicit goods and
services to maximize profits. This distinction remains a useful starting point for analysis, even
though it is sometimes difficult to ascertain the dominant motivation in practice.
International terrorist organizations can mutate into criminal gangs, as evident with various
groups in Latin America and the FSU. Though criminal gangs may mutate into paramilitary
organizations during periods of armed conflict, as happened with Arkan's Tigers in the former
Yugoslavia, this happens less frequently.
Terrorist groups usually claim to act for "justice" on behalf of the people. Any admission or
revelation that they had connections with criminal groups would be counterproductive. For their
part, criminal groups naturally operate in the shadows, shunning publicity that might assist law
enforcement officials. Terrorist -criminal links are thus often difficult to discern, as both groups
have powerful incentives to conceal operational ties.
In theory, two conditions appear necessary for sustained high level terrorist -criminal coordination:
the prospect of mutual gain and the ability to maintain operational secrecy. In practice, these
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conditions are often difficult to achieve. High-level criminal-terrorist collusion thus appears less
frequent than either cooperation among criminal groups or collaboration among terrorist
organizations.
The evolving nature of terrorist -criminal links will depend on several wildcards. Inter-state war,
famine, pestilence, or large-scale migrations may radically alter the future prospects for
cooperation among these groups. Success of US stability operations in Iraq is one of the most
important concerns in this regard. Additional factors are further instability in, or the outright
disintegration of, major states infested with international criminal organizations, such as Colombia
and Russia. Inter-state warfare can also affect the dynamics of terrorist and criminal activity.
Weak states and political disorder favor terrorist organizations and criminal groups, as
demonstrated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Such turmoil makes it easier for unlawful
elements to procure illicit arms and munitions, and smuggle them through porous borders.
Sudan provides an example of how terrorists can exploit conditions of chronic disorder. The
country's weak central authority and seemingly endless civil war has provided an attractive
sanctuary to numerous terrorist groups. These characteristics attracted Osama bin Laden to
Sudan when he was forced to leave Saudi Arabia. By contrast, criminal groups generally prefer
some semblance of state order; however, as such conditions befit their parasitic nature.
Terrorist -criminal links in FSU countries are a significant potential threat to U.S. security. Russia's
bordering states remain a seething cauldron of economic instability, political turmoil, and religious
fever. The region's relative proximity to the Middle East has important consequences, including
the presence of Islamic fighters in the Caucasus region. Islamic terrorists also have struck targets
in Latin America-e.g., the 1992 bombings of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and 1994 attack
on the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association -but overall they are far more active in FSU environs.
Russia will continue to possess thousands of nuclear weapons and an abundant supply of
nuclear materials for the foreseeable future. This fact distinguishes it from all Latin America
countries. Russia's stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material adds up to about 1,000 tons of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium, dispersed among more than 50 sites. Whether sting
operations in Germany and elsewhere have inadvertently created a demand for fissile materials
remains a hotly debated topic. Nonetheless, some of the more sophisticated criminal groups
operating in the FSU appear well-positioned to traffic in nuclear materials, potentially in collusion
with terrorist organizations.
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